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NAVIGATING TRICKY ETHICAL SHOALS
IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW:
PARAMETERS OF COUNSELING AND
MANAGING CLIENTS
Kim DianaConnolly*
The job of an environmental lawyer is complex.' As Stuart L. Somach

summarized in How to BuildandManagean EnvironmentalLaw Practice:
[T]he environment and environmental law involve issues of great
societal importance that, at times, rise to the fervor of a moral
cause or crusade.... Environmental law is policy intensive. It is
a dynamic area of the law that is driven by an underlying ethic

*

Professor Connolly teaches at the University of South Carolina School of Law. An earlier

version of this article was presented as part of the ethics panel at the American Bar Association 38th
Annual Conference on Environmental Law, Keystone Resort and Conference Center, Keystone,
CO, on March 15, 2009, and won a best paper award. See Kim Diana Connolly, The Environmental
Attorney's Challenges in Navigating the Tricky Shoals of Ethical Lauyering in the Context of Model
Rules ofProfssionalConduct2.1 and 1.6,http://www.abanet.org/environ/programs/keystone/2009/
bestpapers/KimDianaConnolly-_Keystone2009.pdf. The author appreciates the research assistance
of Joshua Houser and the helpful comments from Sam Kalen, Charles Victor Pyle, Tommy
Lavender, and EJ. Cumberland, Jr. In June 2010, Professor Connolly will be joining the faculty of
the State University of New York at Buffalo Law School.

'See, e.g., ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, LAw, SCIENCE AND Poucy,
at xxix (3d ed. 2000) ("[E]nvironmental law has generated an immense and fiercely complex web
of regulations that affects the way we live, work, and do business."); ZYGMuNT J.B. PLATER, ROBERT
H. ABRAMs& WuiAM GOLDFARB, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: A COURSEBOOK ON NATRE,

SOcmTr, at i (West 1992) ("[Environmental law] seems more like a flood, challenging our
ability to assimilate its force and volume. There is so much environmental law that few academics
still try to focus on the entire field."); seealsoJ.B. Ruhl, Thinking ofEnvironmentalLaw asa Complex
Adaptive System: How to Clean Up the Environment by Making a Mess of EnvironmentalLaw, 34
Hous. L. REv. 933 (1997).
LAW, AND
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that revolves around core concerns associated with events and
situations that directly affect everyone.
Moreover, environmental law 3 is always developing and changing. As the
Environmental Protection Agency states, "EPA began issuing regulations shortly
after opening its doors in 1970.... We have learned the process is dynamicoften requiring continual adjustments in both substance and process."4 Add to
that a few knotty ethical problems and it becomes a great adventure to be an
environmental law practitioner.
There are indeed tricky shoals to navigate to ensure ethical practice. As
Professor J.B. Ruhl remarked some years ago, clients seeking assistance on
environmental matters are often
dazed by the changing and complex features of environmental
regulations, [and] often ask much, perhaps too much, of
their attorneys: clients want clear assessments and predictions
concerning their past, current, and prospective compliance;
they want definitive answers concerning liability exposure for
potential violations; and they want sure outcomes in government
enforcement actions and other litigation settings.5
Like others who seek the assistance of attorneys, environmental clients push for
high levels ofadvocacy, sometimes to the very edge. As a result, environmental law
practitioners sometimes face certain tensions inherent in drawing an ethical line
in terms of advocacy in the environmental law context.
This article begins by exploring the Model Rule of Professional Conduct
(MRPC) 2.1, regarding counsel's role as "advisor." 6 MRPC 2.1, as explored
in depth below, provides that counseling refers not only to law, but also to
moral, economic, social, and political factors, when making decisions. 7 This
article continues by exploring the environmental lawyer's ability to withdraw
from representation pursuant to MRPC 1.16, which is permitted if (among

2 SuruAir L. SomcH, How TO

BuiLD

AND MANAGE AN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PRACrnCE

4 (2000).
3 For the purpose of this paper, the term "environmental law" is meant to encompass all
aspects of environmental, natural resource, and energy matters.
" U.S. EPA, Improving the Process: Setting the Stage for Future Regulatory Actions, htp:l
www.epa.gov/lawsregs/brochure/improving.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2010).
5 J.B. Ruhl, Malpracticeand EnvironmentalLaw: Should EnvironmentalLaw "Specialists"Be
Worried?, 33 Hous. L. REv. 173, 175 (1996).
6 MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R- 2.1 (2009).
7Id
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other reasons) a client takes action that the lawyer considers repugnant or with
which the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement.8 The article concludes with
a brief examination of the related issue for government counsel with respect to
compliance with the additional Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of
the Executive Branch.'
I. LAWYER AS COUNSELOR:
NOT JusT TELLING CLIENTS WHAT THEY WANT TO HEAR 1°
MRPC 2.1, entitled "Advisor," begins the counseling section (Section 2) of
the rules." It describes and helps set parameters for the attorney's role as an advisor
to the client.' 2 This rule encourages lawyers to use "independent professional
judgment" and render candid advice.'" Yet as two professional ethics scholars have
put it, lawyers "who represent clients zealously within the bounds of the law act
as collaborators who translate or mediate between the private world of clients
and the public world of law."' 4 Most practicing lawyers want to "reconcile their
personal values with their professional life," but that is easier said than done."
The world of environmental law can bring these tensions into stark relief.
Scholars have long recognized the difficulties inherent in the counseling role.
In the past few decades, legal education has focused a great deal on teaching
students so-called "client-centered lawyering." 16 Client-centered representation
is often identified through its focus on legal counseling that, as one scholar
summarized, "seeks to minimize lawyer influence on client decision-making,
relying on strategies of lawyer neutrality." 17 Yet the "core values of client-centered
" Id at R. 1.16.
9 5 C.ER. § 2635.101 (2008).
10See LisA G. LEWAN & PHILIP

G.

SHRAG, ETHicAL PROBLEMS INTHE PRACTICE OF LAw 301

(2d ed. 2008).
" MODEL RULEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT
12

R. 2.1.

Id.

13 Id

J. Fox &
ETHics 312-13 (2005).
14LAWRENCE

SUSAN

R.

MArYN, RED FLAGS:

A

LAWYER'S HANDBOOK ON LEGcAL

1 Id at 313. SeegenerallyJulie A. Oseid & Stephen D. Easton, The Trump Card A Lawyer'
PersonalConscienceor ProfissionalDuty?, 10 Wyo. L.REv. 415 (2010).
16For an excellent history of the client-centered educational movement, see Katherine R.
Kruse, Fortressin the Sand-The PluralValues of Client-CenteredRepresentation, 12 CuNIcAL L. REv.
369 (2006).

17Id. at 371 (citing Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and

Refinement, 32 Aiuz. L. REv. 501, 507 n.22 (1990) (defending the use of the phrase "client
decisionmaking" to describe most accurately Binder & Price's client-centered approach because that

terminology emphasizes the crucial distinction that the dient rather than the lawyer is the actual
decisionmaker)); accord Paul R.Tremblay, On Persuasionand Paternalism:Lawyer Decisionmaking
andtheQuestionablyCompetentClint,1987 UTAH L. REV.515,523 (describing 'client-centeredness"
as the "conviction that the client, and not the lawyer, should remain the primary decisionmaker").
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representation can sometimes come into conflict in situations of actual practice,
posing dilemmas for client-centered lawyers about whether--or how forcefullyto intervene into client decision-making.""8 Indeed, as another scholar has noted,
"the development of independent professional judgment is not given appreciable
attention in the conventional law school curriculum." 9
When one turns to the language of the rule from this perspective, one must
keep in mind that, to the extent adopted by any particular bar, the first sentence
of MRPC 2.1 represents a mandatory rule of conduct. 20 It is taken from Canon

5 of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, evoking the duty to avoid
improper influence by others, whether that includes other clients, third parties, or
even the lawyer herself or himself 2' In context, MRPC 2.1 also implies the duties
of competence (through MRPC 1.1) and communication (through MRPC 1.4)
into nonlitigation frameworks.

22

The resulting duty imposed by MRPC 2.1-to exercise independent
professional judgment-may be threatened not only by others but by clients as
well. As discussed above, a client may consult a lawyer in order to have his or her
own preconceptions confirmed rather than to seek genuine advice.23 Some lawyers
(especially in tough economic times when clients are hard to come by) may be
tempted to agree with a client in questionable circumstances in order to ensure
continued employment. Associate attorneys or those newer to the profession may
feel they are not in a position to exercise such independent judgment. But MPRC
2.1 prohibits giving in to such temptations.
MPRC 2.1 clearly requires the lawyer to exercise judgment that is both
independent and professional, as well as candid. The commentary to the rule
clarifies this:
Legal advice often involves unpleasant facts and alternatives that
a client may be disinclined to confront. In presenting advice,
a lawyer endeavors to sustain the client's morale and may put

IS

Kruse, supra note 16, at 372.

'9 Angela Olivia Burton, CultivatingEthicalZ Socially Responsible LawyerJudgment:Introducing
theMultipleLawyeringIntelligencesParadigminto the ClinicalSetting, 11 CtuNIcAL L. REv. 15 (2004).
20 See generally THOMAS D. MORGAN, LAWYER LAW: COMPARING THE ABA MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCr WITH THE ALI RESTATEMEN-r (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (2005).
The first sentence of MRPC 2.1 reads: "In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent
professional judgment and render candid advice."
21 See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILrrY Canon 5 (1980).
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WIULIA
2000).
' See supra note 5 and accompanying text.

HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING 23-3 (3d ed.
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advice in as acceptable a form as honesty permits. However, a
lawyer should not be deterred from giving candid advice by the
prospect that the advice will be unpalatable to the client.24
Accordingly, in a candid manner, a lawyer complying with this rule will provide
an honest assessment, including sharing all unpleasant facts and alternatives
involved, if relevant. 25 While taking the client's morale into consideration is
expected, assessments in the role of advisor should include frank advice even if a
lawyer feels a client may not like what they hear.26 One can imagine many settings
in the environmental context where these requirements may create tension
between attorneys and clients or cause disagreements as to how to proceed from
the perspective of different attorneys working on the same or related matters.
To compound such tension, the second sentence of MRPC 2.1 adds yet
another important aspect to the lawyer's counseling role. It directs that nonlegal
factors may be taken into account in giving legal advice. 27 This provision does not
operate as a directive, because it states what a lawyer may (and probably should)
do. To this end, this part of the rule is focused on further defining the scope and
powers of the modern attorney-client relationship. 28 As Dean Irma Russell has
noted, "Model Rule 2.1 is evidence of the ABA's recognition of the breadth of
practice for many lawyers and the confidence of the ABA in the ability of lawyers
to provide clients with helpful advice beyond the technical consideration of
legal rules." 29
In other words, under MRPC 2.1 a lawyer is not a mere legal technician,
because such limits may be insufficient to fully serve the client.3 As the
commentary to the rule notes:
Advice couched in narrow legal terms may be of little value
to a client, especially where practical considerations, such as cost
or effects on other people, are predominant. Purely technical
legal advice, therefore, can sometimes be inadequate. It isproper
24 MODEL
25

Id.

26

Id.

Ru s

OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.

2.1 cmt. 1 (2009).

Id. The second sentence of MRPC 2.1 reads: "In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not
only to law, but to other considerations, such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that
may be relevant to the client's situation."
28 Id Section 94(3) of the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers contains similar
language while adding reputational and business aspects to the list of concerns that a conscientious
lawyer might want to discuss with a dient. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAw GOvERNING LAWYERS
§ 94(3) (2000).
29 IRMA S. RussELL, IssuEs OF LEGAL ETHics IN THE PRACrICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
27

56 (2003).
30 MODEL RULEs OF PROF'L CONDUCr

R- 2.1 cmt. 2.
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for a lawyer to refer to relevant moral and ethical considerations
in giving advice. Although a lawyer is not a moral advisor as
such, moral and ethical considerations impinge upon most
legal questions and may decisively influence how the law will
3
be applied. '
This concept has been described under ethical considerations from the old Model
Code of Professional Responsibility as the "fullness of his experience." 2 A client
facing a major legal decision for the first time may feel overwhelmed and unable
to make a judgment, whereas a lawyer can often draw on experiences with similar
decisions that may help the client better understand the economic, moral, and
political ramifications of the decision. 3 Under MRPC 1.2(a), the client has the
ultimate authority and responsibility for setting the objectives of the representation
and for major tactical choices--but that makes it the duty of the lawyer to aid
the client's decision making by bringing these nonlegal considerations into focus,
pursuant to MRPC 2.1.
This duty is nowhere more true than in the environmental context. As Dean
Russell points out:
Examples of the broad role of lawyers serving as advisors abound
in environmental practice. For example, a lawyer representing
a landowner in a sale of real property is justified in pointing
to moral as well as legal considerations mandating disclosure of
dangerous conditions. A lawyer advising a company to reduce
its waste stream of hazardous substances is justified in noting
economic advantages of the reduction3
Moreover, implementation-and thus the associated legal advocacy--of some
environmental regulations even appears to mandate nonlegal considerations, such
as the Public Interest Review required for an individual Clean Water Act Section
404 permit. 35 The Public Interest Review directs that a permit issuance examine
the "benefits which reasonably may be expected to accrue from the proposal" and
balance them

31

Id.

31 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILrrY

EC 7-8 (1980).

33 Id
I

RussELL, supra note 29, at 57.

-5 33

C.ER. pt. 320 (2009). Seegenerally Kim Diana Connolly, Regulation ofCoastalWetlands
and Other Waters of the UnitedStates, in OcEA AND CoAs-rA LAW AND Poucy 87 (Donald C.
Baur, Tim Eichenberg & G. Michael Sutton eds., 2008); Kim Diana Connolly, Shifing Interests:
Rethinking the U.S. Army CorpsofEngineersPermittingProcess andPublicInterestReview in Light of
HurricanesKatrinaandRita, 32 T. M~maHAL. L REv. 109, 115-19 (2006).
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against its reasonably foreseeable detriments. The decision
whether to authorize a proposal, and ifso, the conditions under
which itwill be allowed to occur, are therefore determined by the
outcome of this general balancing process. That decision should
reflect the national concern for both protection and utilization
of important resources. All factors which may be relevant to the
proposal must be considered including the cumulative effects
thereof: among those are conservation, economics, aesthetics,
general environmental concerns, wetlands, historic properties,
fish and wildlife values, flood hazards, floodplain values, land
use, navigation, shore erosion and accretion, recreation, water
supply and conservation, water quality, energy needs, safety, food
and fiber production, mineral needs, considerations of property
6
ownership and, in general, the needs and welfare of the people.
There are many more examples in the environmental law context.
Indeed, Comment 5 to MRPC 2.1 points out that in some cases, the right
to give more extensive advice can evolve into a duty to do so. 37 Purely technical
legal advice can sometimes be inadequate; many legal problems arise in contexts
that are so charged with nonlegal considerations that no "pure" legal choice exists,
and these nonlegal factors directly affect how the law itself will be applied.3" In
such cases, giving inadequate advice could indirectly violate the duties outlined in
MRPC Rule 1.1 (competence) and MRPC Rule 1.4 (communication), because
the lawyer failed to provide the client with sufficient information to allow for
intelligent decision making. 9 Accordingly, the extent to which nonlegal advice
should be offered depends on both the overlap between legal and nonlegal concerns,
as well as the client's sophistication and past course of dealings with the lawyer
and legal situations. 40 For example, even when nonlegal factors predominate, a
client who has previously been counseled by a lawyer may be understood to have
already taken those factors into account when consulting the same lawyer on a
subsequent occasion.4

Therefore, as Dean Russell points out, environmental law practitioners need
to be aware that "[t]he complexity of environmental laws today makes it crucial

3

33 C.ER. § 320.4(a) (2009).

R. 2.1 cmt. 5 (2009).
& HODES, supra note 22, at 23-4.
39 For an analysis suggesting that a lawyer's duty of competence includes advising about
nonlegal aspects of amatter, such as political and moral aspects, see Jamie G. Heller, Legal Counseling
in theAdministrativeState: How to Let the ClientDecide, 103 YALE L.J. 2503 (1994).
40 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 cmts. 2-3.
37 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
31 HAZARD

,1 Id
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that clients (both corporate clients and individuals) have access to legal advisors."42
Yet in giving such advice, the lawyer generally determines how much, if any, will
be nonlegal. Moreover, if the lawyer is already representing a client and learns
nonlegal information that might prompt the client to initiate or redirect action,
the lawyer should not hesitate to bring the information to the client's attention
and volunteer advice.
But how far does the lawyer's role go under this rule? Does it extend as far as
Professor David Dana would suggest-to the point where "a public service lawyer
might decline to inform her clients of statutory and regulatory interpretations
that she believes are contrary to the public purpose of the statutory or regulatory
framework"? 4 1 If not that far, should a public service lawyer "downplay the
attractiveness of those options"?" If yes, is the same true for a lawyer typically
working for the regulated community?
Likewise, is the duty somewhat different for corporate counsel? As Professor
Morgan remarked, "[U] nder Model Rule 2.1, advice about what is narrowly legal
simply may not be enough as to decisions that have a broader impact on the
corporate client." 45 What about criminal clients? Does their situation provide a
lawyer with an increased obligation to counsel in a more directive manner? As
Professor Uphoff wrote a decade ago:
[Flor the lawyer who values individual autonomy, respect for
the client requires that the client be afforded the right to be
foolish or wrong. That right is not, in my view, absolute. Rather,
the good lawyer, like the good parent, will struggle to balance
the client's freedom of choice with the lawyer's duty to prevent
46
clients from inflicting harm upon themselves.
From the discussion in the past few pages, it becomes apparent the directives
of MRPC 2.1 seem somewhat cloudy, and application will of course depend on
the circumstances. It is thus interesting to review the recent findings from some
leading professional responsibility scholars concluding:
Lawyers are seldom disciplined for violation of Rule 2.1, perhaps
because lawyer-client counseling almost always takes place in
secret. In fact, we have not located a single case in which a lawyer
4' RUSSELL,

supra note 29, at 58.

'3 David Dana, EnvironmentalLawyers and the Public ServiceModel of Lawyering,74 OR. L.
REv. 57, 60 (1995).
"Id.

Thomas D. Morgan, NationalSymposium on the Role ofa CorporateLawyer: "The Client(s)
ofa CorporateLawyer, "33 CAP. U. L. REV. 17, 39 (2004).
4'

' Rodney J. Uphoff, Who Should Control the Decision to Calla Witness: Respectinga Criminal
Def ndant's TacticalChoices, 68 U. CIN. L. REv. 763, 834 (2000).
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was disciplined for violating this rule. Not only is enforcement
rare, but there is scant authority discussing what it requires
47
of lawyers.
This finding does not, however, limit the power of the rule-in fact, it may make
it even more important. In an era where environmental law and policy promises
these important rules in mind will
to get more rather than less complex, keeping
48
be vital to successful client representation.
II. MODEL RuLE 1.16:
WHEN CAN AN ENVIRONMENTAL LAWYER HEAD FOR THE DOOR?

In addition to the interesting opportunities and obligations set forth in MRPC
2.1, another tension in advocacy versus ethics is presented in MRPC 1.16, titled
"Declining or Terminating Representation."49 This rule concerns the lawyer's
relationship with the client and deals with both the creation and termination of
the relationship. It is interesting to consider this from the perspective of overall
responsibilities, as phrased by Professors Zitrin and Langford in The Moral
Compass ofthe American Lawyer.
Being professional means holding dear the lawyers' fiduciary
duties to their clients. But it also means recognizing that their
profession exists in significant measure to serve the needs of
their society. Lawyers should continue to represent their clients
loyally and diligently, always looking at matters from the client's
point of view rather than their own. But they must also become
officers of society, not merely "officers of the court."50
MRPC 1.16 begins with the requirement for mandatory withdrawal of
representation in section (a) and simultaneously imposes a corresponding
prohibition on undertaking representation that would be subject to the duty to
withdraw as soon as the representation was initiated.51 This can be important to
the environmental lawyer. Mandatory withdrawal is further subject to MRPC
1.16(c), which recognizes that in litigated matters, the tribunal may conclude
that the public interest-including its interest in the speedy determination of the
47 LERMAN & SHRAG, supra note 10, at 302.
48 As certain alternative dispute resolution scholars pointed out recently, environmental
matters "are often underlain by common scientific and technical facts, with many stakeholders
having different and overlapping interests." ANN L. MAcNAUGHTON & JAY G. MARTIN,
ENVIRONMENTAL DisPuTE RESOLUTON: AN ANTHOLOGY OF PRACTICA. SOLtMONs 5 (2002).
'

MODEL RULEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (2009).

50RicHARD A.

ZMrNr & CAROL MAE LANGFORD, THE MORAL COMPASS OF THE AMERICAN

LAWYER: TRUTH, JUSTICE, POWER, AND GREED 245 (2000).
51 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R 1.16(a).
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dispute-may outweigh the reasons for the lawyer's withdrawal. 2 To this end,
therefore, the tribunal must be asked for permission for a withdrawal to take
place once representation has begun. 3 Another overarching principle applied
to mandatory withdrawal is implied by MRPC 1.16(d), stating that no matter
the cause or impetus for the withdrawal, the lawyer must minimize the harm to
the client. 4
As set forth in MRPC 1.16(a), there are three situations calling for mandatory
withdrawal. The first is the broadest and most controversial: it requires that a
lawyer withdraw or refuse to commence representation if such representation will
result in the violation of any of the other rules of professional conduct or any
other law." This is one of many rules governing situations in which a lawyer
becomes suspicious that her or his client will commit a crime, an act of fraud,
or any other type of unethical behavior, and the lawyer may be exploited in the
carrying out of an illicit scheme.5 6 Abetting the client would therefore violate
MRPC 1.2(d).57 Comment 2 to MRPC 1.16 states that a lawyer is not required
to withdraw if a client merely suggests improper conduct, because there is always
a chance the client will have a change of heart or circumstances will change.5" If,
however, the lawyer senses any ambiguity, then a judgment call must be made
on the likelihood that a violation "will result."59 There are two factors that can
be considered by the lawyer in making this determination. First, the lawyer must
estimate the likelihood that if the transaction goes forward with the attorney's
assistance, fraud or wrongdoing will indeed occur.6 0 Second, the lawyer must
evaluate the risk of being charged later on with being complicit in the wrongdoing
and must balance the importance of continuing the representation in the face

52

Id. atR.1.16(c).

11Id. at R.1.16(a).
5'
55

Id. atR. 1.16(d).
Id. at R.1.16(a)(1); HAzARD & HODES, supra note 22, at 20-9.

56 MRPC 1.16(a)(1) acts as a procedural mechanism for carrying out the command of
MRPC 1.8(c) that prohibits a lawyer from drafting an instrument for a client in which the lawyer
is a substantial beneficiary. Other rules which involve this mechanism are those governing conflicts
of interest (1.7-1.9), as well as those involving imputed disqualification (1.10-1. 12).
57 MRPC 1.2 involves the Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority between
Client and Lawyer, and states:
A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct
that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal
consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or
assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or
application of the law.

MODEL RuttS OF PRO'L CONDUCr
58 Id. at R. 1.16cmt. 2.
s9 Id. at R.1.16.
60

Id

R. 1.2(d).
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of that risk.61 MRPC 1.16(a), while broad, provides leeway to the lawyer to
reasonably determine the most prudent path and also allows the relationship to
be limited based on changing circumstances of the client or situation. One can
envision many environmental situations in which these issues might play out.
The second situation in MRPC 1.16(a) identifies mandatory withdrawal if the
lawyer is too sick or not competent enough to represent the client.6 2 The standard
is whether the lawyer's condition will materially affect the representation.6" This
is a fairly straightforward scenario, but it is complicated by a limiting obligation
to reasonably assist the client, even after withdrawal, as well as the requirement
of tribunal approval of the withdrawal. This is not particularly unique to the
environmental practitioner.
The third situation refers to the client discharging the attorney, recognizing
that as a practical matter the client may terminate the services of the lawyer at
will.6 Therefore it is an obvious duty that once the relationship is terminated by
the client, the lawyer must withdraw upon payment of appropriate fees. It is a
longstanding principle that lawyers are considered independent contractors subject
to a contract-at-will, and therefore generally they have no claim for wrongful
discharge where the other party to the contract terminates it. 65 Furthermore,
because the attorney-client relationship should be based on personal trust and
cooperation, a client who has lost confidence in the lawyer or is unwilling to pay
the lawyer's fees should be free to pursue a more satisfying relationship.66 The only
limits to this discharge are that the presiding tribunal must permit the withdrawal
and the fees must be calculated and settled.67 Again, this is not particularly unique
to environmental practice.
Once a matter is in litigation, as mentioned previously, the duties and
parameters of withdrawal are qualified by MRPC 1.16(c), which contemplates
that the tribunal might order the lawyer to continue the representation despite
there being want or cause to terminate. 6 This consideration requires the lawyer
to formally petition the tribunal or make a motion to withdraw. 69 The tribunal

61

Id.

62

Id.at R. 1.16(a)(2).

63 Id
6The
client has extremely broad powers to discharge the attorney, with courts even holding
that a client may discharge a lawyer based on the lawyer's race. See Giaimo & Vreeburg v. Smith, 599
N.YS.2d 841 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
65 HAzARD & HODES, supra note 22, at 20-8.

66 Id
67

Id

" MODEL

69

Id
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may consider the client's interests, the preservation of the tribunal's resources and
efficiency, as well the fairness to the opposing party.70 Another issue the tribunal
may consider is the probability that the defendant provoked the withdrawal as a
delay tactic or by committing perjury. 7' A tension exists in the procedural aspects
of this system as on the one hand, the lawyer must reveal information to the
tribunal when it is weighing the factors of the withdrawal, but on the other hand,
the lawyer has a duty of confidentiality to the client.72 Comment 3 recognizes this
problem and suggests that the lawyer simply inform the tribunal that "professional
considerations require termination of the representation [and] ordinarily should
be accepted as sufficient." 73 This is, however, problematic as this prevents the
tribunal from considering the whole picture in making its determination. Yet
there has been little agreement on what the best course of action would be. One
suggestion that may have some merit is that of a "noisy withdrawal," but this
74
strategy comes with its own caveats.
In addition to mandatory withdrawals as discussed above, there are
permissive withdrawals. Under MRPC 1.16(b) and consistent with several other
requirements:
[A] lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if:
(1) withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse
effect on the interests of the client;
(2) the client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's
services that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal
or fraudulent;
(3) the client has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime
or fraud;
(4) the client insists upon taking action that the lawyer considers
repugnant or with which the lawyer has a fundamental
disagreement;

70 HAzAD & HODES, supra note 22,

at 20-8.

7' See Manfredi & Levine v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 494, 498-99 (Cal. Ct. App.
1998) (holding that the risk of suborning perjury creates a conflict of interest that may justify an
attorney's withdrawal); Norris v. Lee, No. Civ. A. 93-0441, 1994 WL 143119, at *1-2 (E.D. Pa.
Apr. 15, 1994) (denying a motion for withdrawal premised on an attorney's fear of perjury and
finding that the attorney could still present the non-false evidence).
72 MODEL RuLs OF PROF'L CONDUCT

R. 1.6.

'3 Id. atRK 1.16 cmt. 3.
'4 Douglas R. Williams, Loyal9f Independence and Social Responsibility in the Practice of
Environmental Law, 44 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1061, 1077 (2000).
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(5) the client fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to the
lawyer regarding the lawyer's services and has been given
reasonable warning that the lawyer will withdraw unless the
obligation is fulfilled;
(6) the representation will result in an unreasonable financial
burden on the lawyer or has been rendered unreasonably
difficult by the client; or
75
(7) other good cause for withdrawal exists.

In brief, MRPC 1.16(b) states the circumstances under which a lawyer is
permitted to withdraw from the representation prior to its conclusion. 76 The first
condition is the broadest, permitting withdrawal for any reason or no reason,
just as long as there is no materially adverse effect on the client; but several of the
subsequent grounds for withdrawal are based on the client's faults or misconduct,
even if there will be some materially adverse effect on the client.7 Because the
situation can be attributable to the client, this can effectively prevent the client
from complaining that the lawyer has withdrawn for frivolous reasons. 78 Other
situations-such as MRPC 1.16(b)(4) involving fundamental disagreement
between the parties-should be examined and applied more carefully so as to
not interpret the language too broadly or narrowly. Disagreements between the
parties also tie into the attorney's role as an advisor, as discussed above under the
section on MRPC 2.1, and the lawyer should advise the client on the proposed
course of action-as opposed to dictating it-and work towards an agreeable
solution. Again, there are many environmental disputes one can imagine fitting
into such scenarios.
Although some latitude exists in a discretionary withdrawal if there will be
no harm to the client, some courts continue to discourage certain scenarios, most
often when representation is withdrawn so the lawyer or firm can represent a new
client adverse to the former client. 79 This situation, known as the "hot potato"
rule, most often occurs when a lawyer or firm has already undertaken concurrent
conflicting representations due to a mistake or by operation of a merger.80
75MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R 1.16(b).
76

Id This rule is sometimes referred to as "firing the client."

7 Historically (and prior to the latest version of the rules), some courts have held that lawyers
may never withdraw absent "cause" or client consent. See Lipton v. Boesky, 313 N.W.2d 163, 167
(Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
78 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 22, at 20-22.

79 See, e.g., Picker Int'l, Inc. v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 869 E2d 578, 581 (Fed. Cir. 1989).

80 Picker Int'l, Inc. v. Varian Assocs., Inc, 670 E Supp. 1363, 1365 (N.D. Ohio 1987). The
term "hot potato" stems from the district court's opinion in Picker."[A] firm may not drop a client
like a hot potato, especially if it is in order to keep happy a far more lucrative client." Id

456

WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Vol. 10

As Dean Russell has noted:
Environmental issues often implicate core values of people,
including lawyers. The fact that the health orthe life ofindividuals
or of the community can be implicated in environmental
hazards sets the stage for strong personal feelings. It would not
be surprising for a lawyer with young children to have a strong
reaction to a person charged with dumping hazardous wastes
near the school of the lawyer's children

....

81

Dealing with these feelings is important in terms of navigating the shoals.
Even less dramatic facts, Dean Russell suggests, present situations in which "it
is conceivable that a lawyer's strong personal feelings relating to environmental
violations or policies of the client could come within the permissive withdrawal
8 2

standard."

The last consideration present in MRPC 1.16 is that of mitigating the harm
to a client upon withdrawal. This requirement applies to both mandatory and
permissive withdrawal by the attorney but is limited "to the extent reasonably
possible."8 3 While the circumstances will dictate what may be reasonable, the rule
does enumerate some obvious devices, such as giving reasonable notice to the
client of the withdrawal, allowing time for the client to seek and employ new
counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled, and
refunding any fees or expenses that have not been earned or incurred." Even if the
lawyer is unfairly discharged, the lawyer must take all reasonable steps to mitigate
any consequences to the client.8"

III. THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND THE PRICE OF PUBLIC SERVICE
The Code of Federal Regulations, in section 2635.101, sets forth what it
terms the "[b]asic obligation of public service."8 This provision, which apples to
employees of the executive branch, establishes the priority of the public interest
and gives each employee the responsibility of placing "loyalty to the Constitution,
laws and ethical principles above private gain." 87 This loyalty is necessary in order
to establish a trusting and confident relationship between citizens and the federal
government. Section 2635.101 lists fourteen specific standards:

I

RussELL, supranote 29, at 432.

82

IdL

83

MODEL Rias OF PROF'L CONDucr R. 1.16(d) (2009).

84

Id

85

Id. at R. 1.16 cmt. 9.

86 5 C.ER. § 2635.101 (2008).
87 I

§ 2635.101(a).
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(1) Public service is a public trust, requiring employees to place
loyalty to the Constitution, the laws and ethical principles
above private gain.
(2) Employees shall not hold financial interests that conflict
with the conscientious performance of duty.
(3) Employees shall not engage in financial transactions using
nonpublic Government information or allow the improper
use of such information to further any private interest.
(4) An employee shall not, except as permitted by subpart
B of this part, solicit or accept any gift or other item of
monetary value from any person or entity seeking official
action from, doing business with, or conducting activities
regulated by the employee's agency, or whose interests
may be substantially affected by the performance or
nonperformance of the employee's duties.
(5) Employees shall put forth honest effort in the performance
of their duties.
(6) Employees shall not knowingly make unauthorized
commitments or promises of any kind purporting to bind
the Government.
(7) Employees shall not use public office for private gain.
(8) Employees shall act impartially and not give preferential
treatment to any private organization or individual.
(9) Employees shall protect and conserve Federal property and
shall not use it for other than authorized activities.
(10) Employees shall not engage in outside employment or
activities, including seeking or negotiating for employment, that conflict with official Government duties and
responsibilities.
(11) Employees shall disclose waste, fraud, abuse, and corruption to appropriate authorities.
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(12) Employees shall satisfy in good faith their obligations as
citizens, including all just financial obligations, especially
those-such as Federal, State, or local taxes-that are
imposed by law.
(13) Employees shall adhere to all laws and regulations that
provide equal opportunity for all Americans regardless of
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, or handicap.
(14) Employees shall endeavor to avoid any actions creating
the appearance that they are violating the law or the
ethical standards set forth in this part. Whether particular
circumstances create an appearance that the law or these
standards have been violated shall be determined from the
perspective of a reasonable person with knowledge of the
88
relevant facts.
Some of these standards may arise more often than others in the context of
practicing environmental law, but they should all be kept in mind by employees
of the executive branch. In addition to this blanket list, each agency has its own
subset of supplemental regulations and each agency has a designated agency ethics
official responsible for coordinating and managing the agency's ethics program. 9
IV. CONCLUSION

The issues presented as part of this article are not easy to grapple with.
Reasonable lawyers can differ in their interpretations. Yet one thing remains clear:
there are tricky ethical shoals to be navigated in the practice of environmental law.
This is particularly true at this very interesting time in our society. As one
scholar has put it, " [t ]o lawyers, who have been chiefly responsible for the design
of our government, the adversary ethic is due unblinking loyalty. Adversariness is
the poetry in the heart of democracy." 90 As another scholar has commented:
Using every available legal channel, today, a multitude of groups
aggressively pursue their agendas: women's groups, immigrant
groups . . . environmental groups, labor unions, libertarians,
consumer groups, trade associations, merchants associations,

88Id

89 5 C.ER. § 2635.107.
" JETHRO K LiEsEMA, THE LMGIOus SocIMr
Award of the American Bar Association).

168 (1983) (winner of the Silver Gavel
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professional associations, and more. All of these groups, many in
direct opposition to one another in various legal arenas-in cause
litigation, in battles over judicial appointments, in legislative
and administrative lobbying-routinely claim to be acting in the
name of the common good or public welfare.9'
Determining how to react, what strategy to employ, and when to bow out of these
controversies in the environmental context can present subtle ethical dilemmas to
many practitioners. It is up to each attorney to determine where to draw the line
in terms of what the rules direct, allow, and encourage.
There is no more important time than now for excellent environmental
lawyers to be engaged in good work.92 Likewise, there is no more important time
for such lawyers to be considering how and whether the role of lawyers should be

evolving.
We live in an era in which coming up with sound bites and strategies is often
93
more common than seeking appropriate application of statutes and regulations.
Clients recognize these facts and may push lawyers to come close to-or cross-

91 BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, Law AS A MEANS TO AN END: THREAT TO THE RuLE OF LAw 223 (2006).
92 As Professor Stone wrote in a related context:

[T]he analysis of common heritage heirlooms is even knottier, because our progeny's
very tastes, the foundation of their interests, are destined to be affected by the legacy
we leave them, whether, for example, they have had the chance to experience clear skies
and equatorial forests. Whatever their tastes will be, we know they will be to some
degree endogenous. Therefore we cannot avoid our responsibility in constructing
them, through our choices, into the sort of people they ought to be, at least in some,
if not in every fine detail. Insofar as it is within our influence, ought they to be the
sort of persons who prefer real trees and grass or plastic or virtual substitutes--or are
we willing that they be indifferent, free to choose?
Christopher D. Stone, Ethicsin InternationalEnvironmentalLaw 25 (Univ. of S.Cal. Gould School
of Law, USC Law and Economics Legal Studies Research Paper No. 05-10, 2006), availableat
http://ssrn.com/abstract=705263.
9' John D. Leshy, Natural Resources Policy in the Bush (II) Administration: An Outsider's
SomewhatJaundicedAssessment, 14 DUKE ENvTL. L. & POL'Y F 347, 352 n. 2 1 (citing Jennifer Lee,
GOP ChangesEnvironmentalMessage; Memo Shows PartyHow to Soften Words, S.ATTLn TIMES, Mar.
2, 2003, at Al3):
Some examples: "First, assure your audience that you are committed to 'preserving and
protecting' the environment, but that 'it can be done more wisely and effectively,'"
"The three words Americans are looking for in an environmental policy.., are 'safer,'
'cleaner,' and 'healthier.'" "Absolutely do not raise economic arguments first." "Stay
away from 'risk assessment,' 'cost-benefit analysis,' and other... terminology used
by industry and corporations." "Your plan must be put in terms of the future, not
the past or present... [as in] we are trying to make things even betterfor the future."
Memorandum from the Luntz Research Companies, Straight Talk 132, at http://
www.luntzspeak.com/graphics/LuntzResearch.Memo.pdf (2002).
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the line. I encourage those lawyers to consider, as appropriate, pushing (gently)
back. As one scholar has put it, the law is "a language that lawyers and judges use
when they try to prevent or resolve problems-human conflicts-using official
rules made by the state as their starting point."9 4 The law and rules perhaps should
thus be viewed as just a starting point, and as the first line of the Preamble to
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct reminds us, "A lawyer, as a member
of the legal profession, is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system
and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice." 95 As
I mentioned in the opening of this article, however, these are tricky shoals to
navigate. But carefully plotting a course is exactly what model environmental
lawyers will do.
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